

*Introduction and Theory*

Moreover, since one's willingness to accept influence depends on one's willingness to identify with the stereotypical qualities of an ingroup, the movements not only were conceptualized in universalist terms, rather than Jewish particularist terms; they were also depicted as motivated only by the highest moral and ethical standards. As Cuddihy (1974, 66n) notes, Jewish intellectuals developed a sense that Judaism had a "mission to the West" in which corrupt Western civilization would be confronted by a specifically Jewish sense of morality. To a considerable extent these movements constitute concrete examples of the ancient and recurrent Jewish self-conceptualization as a "light of the nations," reviewed extensively in *SAID* (Ch. 7). This rhetoric of moral condemnation of the outgroup thus represents a secular version of the central pose of post-Enlightenment Jewish intellectuals that Judaism represents a moral beacon to the rest of humanity. But to exert their influence, they were forced to deny the importance of specifically Jewish identity and interests at the heart of the movement.

The high degree of internal group cohesion characteristic of the movements considered in this volume was accompanied by the development of theories that not only possessed a great deal of internal intellectual consistency but also, as in the case of psychoanalysis and radical political theory, could take the form of hermeneutic systems able to accommodate any and all events into their interpretive schemas. And although these movements sought the veneer of science, they inevitably controverted the fundamental principles of science as an individualistic inquiry into the nature of reality (see Ch. 6). Although the extent to which these intellectual and political movements influenced gentile society cannot be assessed with certainty, the material presented in the following chapters is highly compatible with supposing that Jewish-dominated intellectual movements were a critical factor (necessary condition) for the triumph of the intellectual left in late twentieth-century Western societies.

No evolutionist should be surprised at the implicit theory in all this, namely, that intellectual activities of all types may at bottom involve ethnic warfare, any more than one should be surprised at the fact that political and religious ideologies typically reflect the interests of those holding them. The truly doubtful proposition for an evolutionist is whether real social science as a disinterested attempt to understand human behavior is at all possible.

This does not imply that all strongly identified Jewish social scientists participated in the movements discussed in the following chapters. It implies only that Jewish identification and perceived Jewish interests were a powerful motivating force among those who led these movements and among many of their followers. These scientist-activists had very strong Jewish identities. They were very concerned with anti-Semitism and self-consciously developed theories

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aimed at showing that Jewish behavior was irrelevant to anti-Semitism while at same time (in the case of psychoanalysis and the Frankfurt School) showing that gentile ethnocentrism and participation in cohesive anti-Semitic movements were indications of psychopathology.

Collectively, these movements have called into question the fundamental moral, political, cultural, and economic foundations of Western society. It will be apparent that these movements have also served various Jewish interests quite well. It will also become apparent, however, that these movements have often conflicted with the cultural and ultimately genetic interests of important sectors of the non-Jewish, European-derived peoples of late-twentieth-century European and North American societies.

## 2

# The Boasian School of Anthropology and the Decline of Darwinism in the Social Sciences

If...we were to treat Margaret Mead's *Coming of Age in Samoa* as utopia, not as ethnography, then we would understand it better and save a lot of pointless debate. (Robin Fox 1989, 3)

Several writers have commented on the “radical changes” that occurred in the goals and methods of the social sciences consequent to the entry of Jews to these fields (Liebman 1973, 213; see also Degler 1991; Hollinger 1996; Horowitz 1993, 75; Rothman & Lichter 1982). Degler (1991, 188ff) notes that the shift away from Darwinism as the fundamental paradigm of the social sciences resulted from an ideological shift rather than from the emergence of any new empirical data. He also notes that Jewish intellectuals have been instrumental in the decline of Darwinism and other biological perspectives in American social science since the 1930s (p. 200). The opposition of Jewish intellectuals to Darwinism has long been noticed (Lenz 1931, 674; see also comments of John Maynard Smith in Lewin [1992, 43]).<sup>58</sup>

In sociology, the advent of Jewish intellectuals in the pre-World War II period resulted in “a level of politicization unknown to sociology’s founding fathers. It is not only that the names of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim replaced those of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer, but also that the sense of America as a consensual experience gave way to a sense of America as a series of conflicting definitions” (Horowitz 1993, 75). In the post-World War II period, sociology “became populated by Jews to such a degree that jokes abounded: one did not need the synagogue, the *minyan* [i.e., the minimum number of Jews required for a communal religious service] was to be found in sociology departments; or, one did not need a sociology of Jewish life, since the two had become synonymous” (Horowitz 1993, 77). Indeed, the ethnic conflict within American sociology parallels to a remarkable degree the ethnic conflict in American anthropology that is a theme of this chapter. Here the conflict was played out between leftist Jewish social scientists and an old-line, empirically oriented Protestant establishment that was eventually eclipsed:

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American sociology has struggled with the contrary claims of those afflicted with physics envy and researchers... more engaged in the dilemmas of society. In that struggle, midwestern Protestant mandarins of positivist science often came into conflict with East Coast Jews who in turn wrestled with their own Marxist commitments; great quantitative researchers from abroad, like Paul Lazarsfeld at Columbia, sought to disrupt the complacency of native bean counters. (Sennett 1995, 43)

This chapter will emphasize the ethno-political agenda of Franz Boas, but it is worth mentioning the work of Franco-Jewish structuralist anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss because he appears to be similarly motivated, although the French structuralist movement as a whole cannot be viewed as a Jewish intellectual movement. Lévi-Strauss interacted extensively with Boas and acknowledged his influence (Dosse 1997 I, 15, 16). In turn, Lévi-Strauss was very influential in France, Dosse (1997 I, xxi) describing him as “the common father” of Michel Foucault, Louis Althusser, Roland Barthes, and Jacques Lacan. He had a strong Jewish identity and a deep concern with anti-Semitism (Cuddihy 1974, 151ff). In response to an assertion that he was “the very picture of a Jewish intellectual,” Lévi-Strauss stated,

[C]ertain mental attitudes are perhaps more common among Jews than elsewhere... Attitudes that come from the profound feeling of belonging to a national community, all the while knowing that in the midst of this community there are people—fewer and fewer of them I admit—who reject you. One keeps one’s sensitivity attuned, accompanied by the irrational feeling that in all circumstances one has to do a bit more than other people to disarm potential critics. (Lévi-Strauss & Eribon 1991, 155-156)

Like many Jewish intellectuals discussed here, Lévi-Strauss’s writings were aimed at enshrining cultural differences and subverting the universalism of the West, a position that validates the position of Judaism as a non-assimilating group. Like Boas, Lévi-Strauss rejected biological and evolutionary theories. He theorized that cultures, like languages, were arbitrary collections of symbols with no natural relationships to their referents. Lévi-Strauss rejected Western modernization theory in favor of the idea that there were no superior societies. The role of the anthropologist was to be a “natural subversive or convinced opponent of traditional usage” (in Cuddihy 1974, 155) in Western societies, while respecting and even romanticizing the virtues of non-Western societies (see

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Dosse 1997 II, 30). Western universalism and ideas of human rights were viewed as masks for ethnocentrism, colonialism, and genocide:

Levi-Strauss's most significant works were all published during the breakup of the French colonial empire and contributed enormously to the way it was understood by intellectuals... [H]is elegant writings worked an aesthetic transformation on his readers, who were subtly made to feel ashamed to be Europeans... [H]e evoked the beauty, dignity, and irreducible strangeness of Third World cultures that were simply trying to preserve their difference... [H]is writings would soon feed the suspicion among the new left... that all the universal ideas to which Europe claimed allegiance—reason, science, progress, liberal democracy—were culturally specific weapons fashioned to rob the non-European Other of his difference. (Lilla 1998, 37)

Degler (1991, 61) emphasizes the role of Franz Boas in the anti-Darwinian transformation of American social science: "Boas' influence upon American social scientists in matters of race can hardly be exaggerated." Boas engaged in a "life-long assault on the idea that race was a primary source of the differences to be found in the mental or social capabilities of human groups. He accomplished his mission largely through his ceaseless, almost relentless articulation of the concept of culture" (p. 61). "Boas, almost single-handedly, developed in America the concept of culture, which, like a powerful solvent, would in time expunge race from the literature of social science" (p. 71).

Boas did not arrive at the position from a disinterested, scientific inquiry into a vexed if controversial question... There is no doubt that he had a deep interest in collecting evidence and designing arguments that would rebut or refute an ideological outlook—racism—which he considered restrictive upon individuals and undesirable for society... there is a persistent interest in pressing his social values upon the profession and the public. (Degler 1991, 82-83)

As Frank (1997, 731) points out, "The preponderance of Jewish intellectuals in the early years of Boasian anthropology and the Jewish identities of anthropologists in subsequent generations has been downplayed in standard histories of the discipline." Jewish identifications and the pursuit of perceived Jewish interests, particularly in advocating an ideology of cultural pluralism as a model for Western societies, has been the "invisible subject" of American anthropology—invisible because the ethnic identifications and ethnic interests of

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its advocates have been masked by a language of science in which such identifications and interests were publicly illegitimate.

Boas was reared in a “Jewish-liberal” family in which the revolutionary ideals of 1848 remained influential.<sup>59</sup> He developed a “left-liberal posture which... is at once scientific and political” (Stocking 1968, 149). Boas married within his ethnic group (Frank 1997, 733) and was intensely concerned with anti-Semitism from an early period in his life (White 1966, 16). Alfred Kroeber (1943, 8) recounted a story “which [Boas] is said to have revealed confidentially but which cannot be vouched for,... that on hearing an anti-Semitic insult in a public cafe, he threw the speaker out of doors, and was challenged. Next morning his adversary offered to apologize; but Boas insisted that the duel be gone through with. Apocryphal or not, the tale absolutely fits the character of the man as we know him in America.” In a comment that says much about Boas’s Jewish identification as well as his view of gentiles, Boas stated in response to a question regarding how he could have professional dealings with anti-Semites such as Charles Davenport, “If we Jews had to choose to work only with Gentiles certified to be a hundred percent free of anti-Semitism, who could we ever really work with?” (in Sorin 1997, 632n9). Moreover, as has been common among Jewish intellectuals in several historical eras, Boas was deeply alienated from and hostile toward gentile culture, particularly the cultural ideal of the Prussian aristocracy (Degler 1991, 200; Stocking 1968, 150). When Margaret Mead wanted to persuade Boas to let her pursue her research in the South Sea islands, “She hit upon a sure way of getting him to change his mind. ‘I knew there was one thing that mattered more to Boas than the direction taken by anthropological research. This was that he should behave like a liberal, democratic, modern man, not like a Prussian autocrat.’ The ploy worked because she had indeed uncovered the heart of his personal values” (Degler 1991, 73).

I conclude that Boas had a strong Jewish identification and that he was deeply concerned about anti-Semitism. On the basis of the following, it is reasonable to suppose that his concern with anti-Semitism was a major influence in the development of American anthropology.

Indeed, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that ethnic conflict played a major role in the development of American anthropology. Boas’s views conflicted with the then prevalent idea that cultures had evolved in a series of developmental stages labeled savagery, barbarism, and civilization. The stages were associated with racial differences, and modern European culture (and most especially, I suppose, the hated Prussian aristocracy) was at the highest level of this gradation. Wolf (1990, 168) describes the attack of the Boasians as calling into question “the moral and political monopoly of a [gentile] elite which had justified its rule with the claim that their superior virtue was the outcome of the evolutionary process.” Boas’s theories were also meant to counter the racialist

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theories of Houston Stewart Chamberlain (see *SAID*, Ch. 5) and American eugenicists like Madison Grant, whose book, *The Passing of the Great Race* (1921, 17), was highly critical of Boas's research on environmental influences on skull size. The result was that "in message and purpose, [Boas's anthropology] was an explicitly antiracist science" (Frank 1997, 741).

Grant characterized Jewish immigrants as ruthlessly self-interested whereas American Nordics were committing racial suicide and allowing themselves to be "elbowed out" of their own land (1921, 16, 91). Grant also believed Jews were engaged in a campaign to discredit racial research:

It is well-nigh impossible to publish in the American newspapers any reflection upon certain religions or races which are hysterically sensitive even when mentioned by name... Abroad, conditions are fully as bad, and we have the authority of one of the most eminent anthropologists in France that the collection of anthropological measurements and data among French recruits at the outbreak of the Great War was prevented by Jewish influence, which aimed to suppress any suggestion of racial differentiation in France. (1921, xxxi-xxxii)

An important technique of the Boasian school was to cast doubt on general theories of human evolution, such as those implying developmental sequences, by emphasizing the vast diversity and chaotic minutiae of human behavior, as well as the relativism of standards of cultural evaluation. The Boasians argued that general theories of cultural evolution must await a detailed cataloguing of cultural diversity, but in fact no general theories emerged from this body of research in the ensuing half century of its dominance of the profession (Stocking 1968, 210). Because of its rejection of fundamental scientific activities such as generalization and classification, Boasian anthropology may thus be characterized more as an anti-theory than a theory of human culture (White 1966, 15). Boas also opposed research on human genetics—what Derek Freeman (1991, 198) terms his "obscurantist antipathy to genetics."

Boas and his students were intensely concerned with pushing an ideological agenda within the American anthropological profession (Degler 1991; Freeman 1991; Torrey 1992). Boas and his associates had a sense of group identity, a commitment to a common viewpoint, and an agenda to dominate the institutional structure of anthropology (Stocking 1968, 279-280). They were a compact group with a clear intellectual and political agenda rather than individualist seekers of disinterested truth. The defeat of the Darwinians "had not happened without considerable exhortation of 'every mother's son' standing for the 'Right.' Nor had it been accomplished without some rather strong pressure applied both to

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staunch friends and to the ‘weaker brethren’—often by the sheer force of Boas’s personality” (Stocking 1968, 286).

By 1915 the Boasians controlled the American Anthropological Association and held a two-thirds majority on its Executive Board (Stocking 1968, 285). In 1919 Boas could state that “most of the anthropological work done at the present time in the United States” was done by his students at Columbia (in Stocking 1968, 296). By 1926 every major department of anthropology was headed by Boas’s students, the majority of whom were Jewish. His protégé Melville Herskovits (1953, 23) noted that the four decades of the tenure of [Boas’s] professorship at Columbia gave a continuity to his teaching that permitted him to develop students who eventually made up the greater part of the significant professional core of American anthropologists, and who came to man and direct most of the major departments of anthropology in the United States. In their turn, they trained the students who...have continued the tradition in which their teachers were trained.

According to Leslie White (1966, 26), Boas’s most influential students were Ruth Benedict, Alexander Goldenweiser, Melville Herskovits, Alfred Kroeber, Robert Lowie, Margaret Mead, Paul Radin, Edward Sapir, and Leslie Spier. All of this “small, compact group of scholars... gathered about their leader” (White 1966, 26) were Jews with the exception of Kroeber, Benedict, and Mead. Frank (1997, 732) also mentions several other prominent first-generation Jewish students of Boas (Alexander Lesser, Ruth Bunzel, Gene [Regina] Weltfish, Esther Schiff Goldfrank, and Ruth Landes). Sapir’s family fled the pogroms in Russia for New York, where Yiddish was his first language. Although not religious, he took an increasing interest in Jewish topics early in his career and later became engaged in Jewish activism, particularly in establishing a prominent center for Jewish learning in Lithuania (Frank 1997, 735). Ruth Landes’s background also shows the ethnic nexus of the Boasian movement. Her family was prominent in the Jewish leftist subculture of Brooklyn, and she was introduced to Boas by Alexander Goldenweiser, a close friend of her father and another of Boas’s prominent students.

In contrast to the ideological and political basis of Boas’s motivation, Kroeber’s militant environmentalism and defense of the culture concept was “entirely theoretical and professional” (Degler 1991, 90). Neither his private nor his public writings reflect the attention to public policy questions regarding blacks or the general question of race in American life that are so conspicuous in Boas’s professional correspondence and publications. Kroeber rejected race as an analytical category as forthrightly and thoroughly as Boas, but he reached that position primarily through theory rather than ideology. Kroeber argued that “our business is to promote anthropology rather than to wage battles on behalf of tolerance in other fields” (in Stocking 1968, 286).<sup>60</sup>



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Ashley Montagu was another influential student of Boas (see Shipman 1994, 159ff). Montagu, whose original name was Israel Ehrenberg, was a highly visible crusader in the battle against the idea of racial differences in mental capacities. He was also highly conscious of being Jewish, stating on one occasion that “if you are brought up a Jew, you know that all non-Jews are anti-Semitic... I think it is a good working hypothesis” (in Shipman, 1994, 166). Montagu asserted that race is a socially constructed myth. Humans are innately cooperative (but not innately aggressive) and there is a universal brotherhood among humans—a highly problematic idea for many in the wake of World War II. Mention also should be made of Otto Klineberg, a professor of psychology at Columbia. Klineberg was “tireless” and “ingenious” in his arguments against the reality of racial differences. He came under the influence of Boas at Columbia and dedicated his 1935 book *Race Differences* to him. Klineberg “made it his business to do for psychology what his friend and colleague at Columbia [Boas] had done for anthropology: to rid his discipline of racial explanations for human social differences” (Degler 1991, 179).

It is interesting in this regard that the members of the Boasian school who achieved the greatest public renown were two gentiles, Benedict and Mead.<sup>61</sup> As in several other prominent historical cases (see Chs. 3, 4; *SAID*, Ch. 6), gentiles became the publicly visible spokespersons for a movement dominated by Jews. Indeed, like Freud, Boas recruited gentiles into his movement out of concern “that his Jewishness would make his science appear partisan and thus compromised” (Efron 1994, 180).

Boas devised Margaret Mead’s classic study on adolescence in Samoa with an eye to its usefulness in the nature-nurture debate raging at the time (Freeman 1983, 60-61, 75). The result of this research was *Coming of Age in Samoa*—a book that revolutionized American anthropology in the direction of radical environmentalism. Its success stemmed ultimately from its promotion by Boas’s students in departments of anthropology at prominent American universities (Freeman 1991). This work and Ruth Benedict’s *Patterns of Culture* were also widely influential among other social scientists, psychiatrists, and the public at large, so that “by the middle of the twentieth century, it was a commonplace for educated Americans to refer to human differences in cultural terms, and to say that ‘modern science has shown that all human races are equal’” (Stocking 1968, 306).

Boas rarely cited works of people outside his group except to disparage them, whereas, as with Mead’s and Benedict’s work, he strenuously promoted and cited the work of people within the ingroup. The Boasian school of anthropology thus came to resemble in a microcosm key features of Judaism as a highly collectivist group evolutionary strategy: a high level of ingroup identification, exclusionary policies, and cohesiveness in pursuit of common interests.

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Boasian anthropology, at least during Boas's lifetime, also resembled traditional Judaism in another critical manner: It was highly authoritarian and intolerant of dissent. As in the case of Freud (see Ch. 4), Boas was a patriarchal father figure, strongly supporting those who agreed with him and excluding those who did not: Alfred Kroeber regarded Boas as "a true patriarch" who "functioned as a powerful father figure, cherishing and supporting those with whom he identified in the degree that he felt they were genuinely identifying with him, but, as regards others, aloof and probably fundamentally indifferent, coldly hostile if the occasion demanded it" (in Stocking 1968, 305-306). "Boas has all the attributes of the head of a cult, a revered charismatic teacher and master, 'literally worshipped' by disciples whose 'permanent loyalty' has been 'effectively established'" (White 1966, 25-26).

As in the case of Freud, in the eyes of his disciples virtually everything Boas did was of monumental importance and justified placing him among the intellectual giants of all time. Like Freud, Boas did not tolerate theoretical or ideological differences with his students. Individuals who disagreed with the leader or had personality clashes with him, such as Clark Wissler and Ralph Linton, were simply excluded from the movement. White (1966, 26-27) represents the exclusion of Wissler and Linton as having ethnic overtones. Both were gentiles. White (1966, 26-27) also suggests that George A. Dorsey's status as a gentile was relevant to his exclusion from the Boas group despite Dorsey's intensive efforts to be a member. Kroeber (1956, 26) describes how George A. Dorsey, "an American-born gentile and a Ph.D. from Harvard, tried to gain admittance to the select group but failed." As an aspect of this authoritarianism, Boas was instrumental in completely suppressing evolutionary theory in anthropology (Freeman 1990, 197).

Boas was the quintessential skeptic and an ardent defender of methodological rigor when it came to theories of cultural evolution and genetic influences on individual differences, yet "the burden of proof rested lightly upon Boas's own shoulders" (White 1966, 12). Although Boas (like Freud; see Ch. 4) made his conjectures in a very dogmatic manner, his "historical reconstructions are inferences, guesses, and unsupported assertions [ranging] from the possible to the preposterous. Almost none is verifiable" (White 1966, 13). An unrelenting foe of generalization and theory construction, Boas nevertheless completely accepted the "absolute generalization at which [Margaret] Mead had arrived after probing for a few months into adolescent behavior on Samoa," even though Mead's results were contrary to previous research in the area (Freeman 1983, 291). Moreover, Boas uncritically allowed Ruth Benedict to distort his own data on the Kwakiutl (see Torrey 1992, 83).

The entire enterprise may thus be characterized as a highly authoritarian political movement centered around a charismatic leader. The results were

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extraordinarily successful: “The profession as a whole was united within a single national organization of academically oriented anthropologists. By and large, they shared a common understanding of the fundamental significance of the historically conditioned variety of human cultures in the determination of human behavior” (Stocking 1968, 296). Research on racial differences ceased, and the profession completely excluded eugenicists and racial theorists like Madison Grant and Charles Davenport.

By the mid-1930s the Boasian view of the cultural determination of human behavior had a strong influence on social scientists generally (Stocking 1968, 300). The followers of Boas also eventually became some of the most influential academic supporters of psychoanalysis (Harris 1968, 431). Marvin Harris (1968, 431) notes that psychoanalysis was adopted by the Boasian school because of its utility as a critique of Euro-American culture, and, indeed, as we shall see in later chapters, psychoanalysis is an ideal vehicle of cultural critique. In the hands of the Boasian school, psychoanalysis was completely stripped of its evolutionary associations and there was a much greater accommodation to the importance of cultural variables (Harris 1968, 433).<sup>62</sup>

Cultural critique was also an important aspect of the Boasian school. Stocking (1989, 215-216) shows that several prominent Boasians, including Robert Lowie and Edward Sapir, were involved in the cultural criticism of the 1920s which centered around the perception of American culture as overly homogeneous, hypocritical, and emotionally and esthetically repressive (especially with regard to sexuality). Central to this program was creating ethnographies of idyllic cultures that were free of the negatively perceived traits that were attributed to Western culture. Among these Boasians, cultural criticism crystallized as an ideology of “romantic primitivism” in which certain non-Western cultures epitomized the approved characteristics Western societies should emulate.

Cultural criticism was a central feature of the two most prominent Boasian ethnographies, *Coming of Age in Samoa* and *Patterns of Culture*. These works are not only erroneous but systematically misrepresent key issues related to evolutionary perspectives on human behavior. For example, Benedict’s Zuni were described as being free of war, homicide, and concern with accumulation of wealth. Children were not disciplined. Sex was casual, with little concern for virginity, sexual possessiveness, or paternity confidence. Contemporary Western societies are, of course, the opposite of these idyllic paradises, and Benedict suggests that we should study such cultures in order “to pass judgment on the dominant traits of our own civilization” (Benedict 1934, 249). Mead’s similar portrayal of the Samoans ignored her own evidence contrary to her thesis (Orans 1996, 155). Negatively perceived behaviors of Mead’s Samoans, such as rape

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and concern for virginity, were attributed to Western influence (Stocking 1989, 245).

Both of these ethnographic accounts have been subjected to devastating criticisms. The picture of these societies that has emerged is far more compatible with evolutionary expectations than the societies depicted by Benedict and Mead (see Caton 1990; Freeman 1983; Orans 1996; Stocking 1989). In the controversy surrounding Mead's work, some defenders of Mead have pointed to possible negative political implications of the demythologization of her work (see, e.g., the summary in Caton 1990, 226-227). The highly politicized context of the questions raised by this research thus continues unabated.

Indeed, one consequence of the triumph of the Boasians was that there was almost no research on warfare and violence among the peoples studied by anthropologists (Keegan 1993, 90-94). Warfare and warriors were ignored, and cultures were conceived as consisting of myth-makers and gift-givers. (Orans [1996, 120] shows that Mead systematically ignored cases of rape, violence, revolution, and competition in her account of Samoa.) Only five articles on the anthropology of war appeared during the 1950s. Revealingly, when Harry Turney-High published his volume *Primitive Warfare* in 1949 documenting the universality of warfare and its oftentimes awesome savagery, the book was completely ignored by the anthropological profession—another example of the exclusionary tactics used against dissenters among the Boasians and characteristic of the other intellectual movements reviewed in this volume as well. Turney-High's massive data on non-Western peoples conflicted with the image of them favored by a highly politicized profession whose members simply excluded these data entirely from intellectual discourse. The result was a "pacified past" (Keeley 1996, 163ff) and an "attitude of self-reproach" (p. 179) in which the behavior of primitive peoples was bowdlerized while the behavior of European peoples was not only excoriated as uniquely evil but also as responsible for all extant examples of warfare among primitive peoples. From this perspective, it is only the fundamental inadequacy of European culture that prevents an idyllic world free from between-group conflict.

The reality, of course, is far different. Warfare was and remains a recurrent phenomenon among prestate societies. Surveys indicate over 90 percent of societies engage in warfare, the great majority engaging in military activities at least once per year (Keeley 1996, 27-32). Moreover, "whenever modern humans appear on the scene, definitive evidence of homicidal violence becomes more common, given a sufficient number of burials (Keeley 1996, 37). Because of its frequency and the seriousness of its consequences, primitive warfare was more deadly than civilized warfare. Most adult males in primitive and prehistoric societies engaged in warfare and "saw combat repeatedly in a lifetime" (Keeley, 1996, 174).

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## **BEYOND BOAS: RECENT EXAMPLES OF JEWISH POLITICAL AGENDAS INFLUENCING SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH**

Jewish influence on the social sciences has extended far beyond Boas and the American Anthropological Association. Hollinger (1996, 4) notes “the transformation of the ethnoreligious demography of American academic life by Jews” in the period from the 1930s to the 1960s, as well as the Jewish influence on trends toward the secularization of American society and in advancing an ideal of cosmopolitanism (p. 11). As early as the early 1940s, this transformation resulted in “a secular, increasingly Jewish, decidedly left-of-center intelligentsia based largely but not exclusively in the disciplinary communities of philosophy and the social sciences” (Hollinger 1996, 160). By 1968, Jews constituted 20 percent of the faculty of elite American colleges and universities and constituted 30 percent of the “most liberal” faculty. At this time, Jews, representing less than 3 percent of the population, constituted 25 percent of the social science faculty at elite universities and 40 percent of liberal faculty who published most (see Rothman & Lichter 1982, 103). Jewish academics were also far more likely to support “progressive” or communist parties from the 1930s to the 1950s. In 1948 30 percent of Jewish faculty voted for the Progressive Party, compared to less than 5 percent for gentile faculty (Rothman & Lichter 1982, 103).

Boas, who was a socialist, is a good example of the leftist bent of Jewish social scientists, and many of his followers were political radicals (Torrey 1992, 57).<sup>63</sup> Similar associations are apparent in the psychoanalytic movement and the Frankfurt School of Social Research (see Chs. 4, 5) as well as among several critics of sociobiology mentioned in this chapter (e.g., Jerry Hirsch, R. C. Lewontin, and Steven Rose). The attraction of Jewish intellectuals to the left is a general phenomenon and has typically co-occurred with a strong Jewish identity and sense of pursuing specifically Jewish interests (see Ch. 3).

Stephen Jay Gould and Leon Kamin are good examples of these trends. Gould’s (1992) perspective on social influences on evolutionary theory was mentioned in *SAID* (Ch. 5), and Gould himself would appear to be a prime example of this conflation of personal and ethnopolitical interests in the construction of science. Gould has been an ardent, highly publicized opponent of evolutionary approaches to human behavior. Like many of the other prominent critics of sociobiology (e.g., J. Hirsch, L. Kamin, R. C. Lewontin, and S. Rose; see Myers 1990), Gould is Jewish, and Michael Ruse (1989, 203) notes that a very prominent theme of Gould’s (1981/1996a) *The Mismeasure of Man* was how hereditarian views on intelligence had been used by “Teutonic supremacists” to discriminate against Jews early in the century. Gould’s views

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on the IQ debates of the 1920s and their link to the immigration issue and eventually the Holocaust bear scrutiny. They illustrate how skill as a propagandist and ethnic activist can be combined with a highly visible and prestigious academic position to have a major influence on public attitudes in an area of research with great implications for public policy.

Ruse points out that Gould's book was very passionately written and was "widely criticized" by historians of psychology, suggesting that Gould had allowed his feelings about anti-Semitism to color his scientific writings on genetic influences on individual differences in intelligence.

Ruse goes on as follows:

It does not seem to me entirely implausible to suggest that Gould's passion against human sociobiology was linked to the fear that it was yet another tool which could be used for anti-semitic purposes. I did ask Gould about this once... He did not entirely repudiate the idea, but inclined to think that the opposition stemmed more from Marxism, and as it so contingently happens, most American Marxists are from Eastern European Jewish families. Perhaps both factors were involved. (Ruse 1989, 203)

Gould's comments highlight the fact that the role of Jewish academics in opposing Darwinian approaches to human behavior has often co-occurred with a strong commitment to a leftist political agenda. Indeed, Gould has acknowledged that his theory of evolution as punctuated equilibria was attractive to him as a Marxist because it posited periodic revolutionary upheavals in evolution rather than conservative, gradualist change. Gould learned his Marxism "at his Daddy's knee" (see Gould 1996a, 39), indicating that he grew up as part of the Jewish-Marxist subculture discussed in Chapter 3. In a recent article Gould (1996c) reminisces fondly about the *Forward*, a politically radical but also ethnically conscious Yiddish newspaper (see Ch. 3), stating that he recalls that many of his relatives bought the newspaper daily. As Arthur Hertzberg (1989, 211-212) notes, "Those who read the *Forward* knew that the commitment of Jews to remain Jewish was beyond question and discussion."

Although Gould's family did not practice Jewish religious rituals, his family "embraced Jewish culture" (Mahler 1996). A common ingredient in Jewish culture is a sense of the historical prevalence of anti-Semitism (see *SAID*, Ch. 6), and Gould's sense of the historical oppression of Jews comes out in his recent review of *The Bell Curve* (Gould, 1994b), where he rejects Herrnstein and Murray's (1994) vision of a socially cohesive society where everyone has a valued role to play: "They [Herrnstein and Murray] have forgotten about the



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town Jew and the dwellers on the other side of the tracks in many of these idyllic villages.” Clearly Gould is blaming historical Western societies for failing to include Jews in their social structures of hierarchic harmony and social cohesiveness. In Chapter 8, I will return to the issue of the incompatibility of Judaism with this quintessential Western form of social structure.

Kamin and Gould have quite similar backgrounds in the leftist Jewish subculture described more fully in Chapter 3, and they share with many American Jews a strong personal animosity to the immigration legislation of the 1920s (see Ch. 7). Kamin, the son of an immigrant rabbi from Poland, acknowledges that “the experience growing up Jewish in a small and predominantly Christian town strongly sensitized him to the power of the social environment in shaping personality” (Fancher 1985, 201)—a comment that also suggests that Kamin grew up with a strong Jewish identity. While at Harvard, Kamin joined the Communist Party and became the New England editor of the party’s newspaper. After resigning from the party, he became a target of Joseph McCarthy’s Senate Subcommittee Hearings in 1953. Kamin was charged and acquitted on technical grounds of charges of criminal contempt of Congress for failing to answer all the questions of the subcommittee. Fancher describes Kamin’s work on IQ as having “little pretense to ‘objectivity’” (p. 212), and suggests a link between Kamin’s background and his position on IQ: “No doubt reflecting that his own middle-European family [and, I suppose, other Jews] could have been excluded by the restrictive immigration laws, Kamin concluded that an arrogant and unfounded assumption of IQ heritability had helped produce an unjust social policy in the 1920s” (p. 208).

Kamin (1974a,b) and Gould (1981/1996a) have been in the forefront of spreading disinformation about the role of IQ testing in the immigration debates of the 1920s. Snyderman and Herrnstein (1983; see also Samelson 1982) show that Kamin and Gould misrepresented H. H. Goddard’s (1917) study of the IQ of Jewish immigrants as indicating that “83 percent of the Jews, 80 percent of the Hungarians, 79 percent of the Italians, and 87 percent of the Russians were ‘feeble-minded’” (Kamin 1974, 16). As Snyderman and Herrnstein (1983, 987) note, “The ‘fact’ that is most often cited as evidence of IQ’s nativistic bias was not based on IQ scores, not taken even by its discoverer as accurately representative of immigrants or as a clean measure of inherited abilities, and it used a test that was known at the time to exaggerate feeble-mindedness in adult populations of all sorts.” Indeed, Goddard (1917, 270) noted that “we have no data on this point, but indirectly we may argue that it is far more probable that their condition is due to environment than it is due to heredity,” and he cited his own work indicating that immigrants accounted for only 4.5 percent of inmates in institutions for the feeble-minded.

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Degler (1991, 39) finds that Gould engaged in a “single minded pursuit” of Goddard (p. 40), presenting a false picture of Goddard as a “rigid hereditarian or elitist.” Gould ignored Goddard’s doubts and qualifications as well as his statements on the importance of the environment. There can be little doubt that Gould was engaging in scholarly fraud in this endeavor: Degler (1991, 354n16) notes that Gould quoted Goddard just prior to the following passage and was thus aware that Goddard was far from rigid in his beliefs on the nature of feeble-mindedness: “Even now we are far from believing the case [on whether feeble-mindedness is a unitary character] settled. The problem is too deep to be thus easily disposed of.” Nevertheless, Gould chose to ignore the passage. Gould also ignored Degler’s comments in his 1996 revision of *The Mismeasure of Man* described more fully below.

Moreover, Kamin and Gould present a highly exaggerated and largely false account of the general attitudes of the testing community on the subject of ethnic group differences in intelligence as well as the role of IQ testing in the congressional debates of the period (Degler 1991, 52; Samelson 1975, 473; Snyderman & Herrnstein 1983)—the latter point confirmed in my own reading of the debates. Indeed, IQ testing was never mentioned in either the House Majority Report or the Minority Report. (The Minority Report was written and signed by the two Jewish congressmen, Representatives Dickstein and Sabath, who led the battle against restrictionism.) Contrary to Gould’s (1981, 232) claim that “Congressional debates leading to passage of the Immigration Restriction Act of 1924 continually invoke the army [IQ] test data,” Snyderman and Herrnstein (1983, 994) note that “there is no mention of intelligence testing in the Act; test results on immigrants appear only briefly in the committee hearings and are then largely ignored or criticized, and they are brought up only once in over 600 pages of congressional floor debate, where they are subjected to further criticism without rejoinder. None of the major contemporary figures in testing... were called to testify, nor were their writings inserted into the legislative record” (Snyderman & Herrnstein 1983, 994). Also, as Samelson (1975) points out, the drive to restrict immigration originated long before IQ testing came into existence, and restriction was favored by a variety of groups, including organized labor, for reasons other than those related to race and IQ, including especially the fairness of maintaining the ethnic status quo in the United States (see Ch. 7).

Samelson (1975) describes several other areas of Kamin’s scholarly malfeasance, most notably his defamatory discussions of Goddard,<sup>64</sup> Lewis M. Terman, and Robert M. Yerkes in which these pioneers of mental testing are portrayed as allowing political beliefs to color their data. Terman, for example, found that Asians were not inferior to Caucasians, results he reasonably interpreted as indicating the inadequacy of cultural explanations; these findings are compatible with contemporary data (Lynn 1987; Rushton 1995). Jews were



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also overrepresented in Terman's study of gifted children, a result that was trumpeted in the Jewish press at the time (e.g., *The American Hebrew*, July 13, 1923, p. 177) and is compatible with contemporary data (PTSDA, Ch. 7). Both findings are contrary to the theory of Nordic superiority.

Kamin (1974a, 27) also concluded that "the use of the 1890 census had only one purpose, acknowledged by the bill's supporters. The 'New Immigration' had begun after 1890, and the law was designed to exclude the biologically inferior... peoples of southeastern Europe." This is a very tendentious interpretation of the motives of the restrictionists. As discussed in Chapter 7, the 1890 census of the foreign born was used because the percentages of foreign born ethnic groups in 1890 approximated the proportions of these groups in the general population as of 1920. The principle argument of the restrictionists was that use of the 1890 census was fair to all ethnic groups.

This false picture of the 1920s debates was then used by Gould, Kamin, and others to argue that the "overtly racist immigration act" of 1924 (Kamin 1982, 98) was passed because of racist bias emanating from the IQ-testing community and that this law was a primary cause of the death of Jews in the Holocaust. Thus Kamin (1974, 27) concluded that "the law, for which the science of mental testing may claim substantial credit, resulted in the deaths of literally hundreds of thousands of victims of the Nazi biological theorists. The victims were denied admission to the United States because the 'German quota' was filled." Kamin's portrayal of early-twentieth-century intelligence testing became received wisdom, appearing repeatedly in newspapers, popular magazines, court decisions, and occasionally even scholarly publications. My own introduction to Kamin's ideas came from reading a popular textbook on developmental psychology I was using in my teaching.

Similarly, Gould proposes a link between hereditarian views on IQ and the 1924 U.S. immigration law that restricted immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe and biased immigration in favor of the peoples of Northwestern Europe. The 1924 immigration law is then linked to the Holocaust:

The quotas...slowed immigration from southern and eastern Europe to a trickle. Throughout the 1930s, Jewish refugees, anticipating the holocaust, sought to emigrate, but were not admitted. The legal quotas, and continuing eugenical propaganda, barred them even in years when inflated quotas for western and northern European nations were not filled. Chase (1977) has estimated that the quotas barred up to 6 million southern, central, and eastern Europeans between 1924 and the outbreak of World War II (assuming that immigration had continued at its pre-1924 rate). We know what happened to

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many who wished to leave but had nowhere to go. The paths to destruction are often indirect, but ideas can be agents as sure as guns and bombs. (Gould 1981, 233; see also Gould 1998)

Indeed, although there is no evidence that IQ testing or eugenic theories had anything more than a trivial influence on the 1924 immigration law, there is evidence that the law was perceived by Jews as directed against them (see Ch. 7). Moreover, concerns about Jews and their ultimate effect on American society may well have been a motive of some of the gentiles favoring immigration restriction, including, among the intellectuals, Madison Grant and Charles Davenport.

Because of his desire to counteract the publicity given to *The Bell Curve* (see Gould 1996a, 31), Gould reissued *The Mismeasure of Man* in 1996 with a new introduction in which he states, “May I end up next to Judas Iscariot, Brutus, and Cassius in the devil’s mouth at the center of hell if I ever fail to present my most honest assessment and best judgment of the evidence for empirical truth” (p. 39). Despite this (rather self-consciously defensive) pledge of scholarly objectivity, Gould took no steps to deal with the objections of his critics—exactly the type of behavior one expects in a propagandist rather than a scholar (see Rushton 1997). The Snyderman and Herrnstein article, Samelson’s work, and Degler’s (1991) book are not cited at all, and Gould does not retract his statement that IQ testing was a prominent feature of the congressional immigration debates of the 1920s.

Perhaps most egregiously of all, Gould makes the amazing argument that he will continue to ignore all recent scholarship on IQ in favor of the older “classical” research because of the “transient and ephemeral” nature of contemporary scholarship (1996a, 22). The argument is that there is no progress in IQ research but only a recurrence of the same bad arguments—a comment that I doubt Gould would apply to any other area of science. Thus Gould continues to denigrate studies linking brain size with IQ despite a great deal of contrary research both prior to and especially since his 1981 edition (see summary below). Using Magnetic Resonance Imaging to get a more accurate measure of brain size, modern research thus vindicates the discoveries of nineteenth-century pioneers like Paul Broca, Francis Galton, and Samuel George Morton who are systematically defamed by Gould. However, as Rushton (1997) notes, Gould’s revised edition apparently omitted his 1981 discussion of Arthur Jensen’s research on the brain size/IQ correlation because of his realization that the contemporary data are unequivocal in their support of a moderate ( $r > .40$ ) association. Instead, in the 1996 edition Gould reprints his approval of a 1971 review of the literature that concluded that there was no relationship. Gould’s revision thus ignores 25 years of research, including Van Valen’s (1974) paper on which Jensen’s ideas were based.

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In his revision, Gould also does not discuss an article by J. S. Michael (1988) that shows that, contrary to Gould's claim, Samuel George Morton did not fudge his data on race differences in skull size, intentionally or otherwise. Moreover, although Morton's research "was conducted with integrity" (Michael 1988, 253), it included an error that actually favored a non-Caucasian group—an error that Gould failed to mention while at the same time Gould himself made systematic errors and used arbitrarily chosen procedures in his calculations. And Gould did so in a manner that favored his own hypothesis that there are no racial differences in cranial capacity.

Gould also failed to revise his defamation of H. H. Goddard in which he claimed that Goddard had doctored photographs of the famous Kallikak family to make them look mentally retarded and menacing. (In his study, Goddard had compared the Kallikaks, who were the descendants of a tavern maid and an upstanding citizen, with the descendants of the same man and his wife.) A subsequent study by Glenn and Ellis (1988) appearing well before the revised edition concluded, however, that these photographs are judged as appearing "kind." To put it charitably, Gould's presuppositions about the malicious intentions of IQ researchers results in his overattributing bias to others.

Finally, in the 1996 revision Gould failed to rebut arguments against his claim that  $g$  (i.e., general intelligence) was nothing more than a statistical artifact (see, e.g., Carroll 1995; Hunt 1995; Jensen & Weng 1994). This is noteworthy because in his introduction to the 1996 edition, Gould is clearly apologetic about his lack of expertise as a historian of science or as a psychologist, but he does claim to be an expert in factor analysis. His failure to mount a defense against his scholarly critics is therefore another example of his intellectual dishonesty in the service of his ethno-political agenda. As the review of the 1996 edition by Rushton (1997) indicates, a great many other errors of commission and omission abound in *Mismeasure of Man*, all having to do with politically sensitive issues involving racial differences and sex differences in cognitive abilities.

Gould has also strongly opposed the idea that there is progress in evolution, quite possibly because of his belief that such ideas among German evolutionists contributed to the rise of National Socialism (See Robert Richards's comments in Lewin 1992, 143). As recounted by Lewin (1992, 144), Gould acknowledges an ideological influence on his beliefs but reiterates his belief that the trends toward greater intelligence and larger brain size are not important in the overall scheme of evolution. (The idea that advances in complexity are important to evolution continues to draw a great deal of support [Bonner 1988; Russell 1983, 1989; E. O. Wilson {see Miele 1998, 83}]). However, Gould acknowledges that there is a deeper issue at stake than whether all animal groups show this tendency. At the basis of this perspective is Gould's assertion that human consciousness, intelligence, and the general trend toward larger brain size in human evolution

are mere accidents and did not contribute to Darwinian fitness or to the solution of adaptive problems in ancestral environments (see Lewin 1992, 145-146).<sup>65</sup> His perspective is thus meant to be a skirmish in the nature-nurture debate over intelligence.<sup>66</sup>

In addition, Dennett's (1993, 1995) devastating analysis of the rhetorical devices used by Gould in his war against adaptationism leaves little doubt regarding the fundamental intellectual dishonesty of Gould's writings. Dennett implies that a non-scientific agenda motivates Gould but stops short of attempting to analyze the reasons for this agenda. Gould (1993, 317) himself recounts an incident in which the British biologist Arthur Cain, referring to Gould and Lewontin's (1979) famous anti-adaptationist paper "The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian paradigm: A critique of the adaptationist programme," accused him of having "betrayed the norms of science and intellectual decency by denying something that we knew to be true (adaptationism) because he so disliked the political implications of an argument (sociobiology) based upon it."

The verdict must be that Gould has indeed forfeited his membership in the "ancient and universal company of scholars" and will spend his afterlife in the devil's mouth at the center of hell. However, it is noteworthy that despite the widespread belief that Gould has a highly politicized agenda and is dishonest and self-serving as a scholar, the prominent evolutionary biologist John Maynard Smith (1995, 46) notes that "he has come to be seen by non-biologists as the pre-eminent evolutionary theorist. In contrast, the evolutionary biologists with whom I have discussed his work tend to see him as a man whose ideas are so confused as to be hardly worth bothering with... All this would not matter were it not that he is giving non-biologists a largely false picture of the state of evolutionary theory." Similarly, Steven Pinker (1997), a prominent linguist and a major figure in the evolutionary psychology movement, labels Gould's ideas on adaptationism "misguided" and "uninformed." He also takes Gould to task for failing to properly cite the widely known work of G. C. Williams and Donald Symons in which these authors have proposed non-adaptive explanations for some human behaviors while nevertheless adopting an adaptationist perspective on human behavior generally. Gould has thus dishonestly taken credit for others' ideas while utilizing them in a wholly inappropriate manner to discredit the adaptationist program generally.

In an article entitled "*Homo deceptus*: Never trust Stephen Jay Gould," journalist Robert Wright (1996), author of *The Moral Animal* (Basic Books, 1994), makes the same charge in a debate over a flagrantly dishonest interpretation by Gould (1996b) of the evolutionary psychology of sex differences. Wright notes that Gould "has convinced the public he is not merely a great writer, but a great theorist of evolution. Yet among top-flight evolutionary

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biologists, Gould is considered a pest—not just a lightweight but an actively muddled man who has warped the public’s understanding of Darwinism.” A false picture perhaps, but one that is not without its usefulness in satisfying political and, I suppose, ethnic agendas.

Another prominent biologist, John Alcock (1997), provides an extended and, I think, accurate analysis of several aspects of Gould’s rhetorical style: demonstrations of erudition—foreign phrases, poetry—irrelevant to the intellectual arguments but widely regarded even by his critics; branding the opposition with denigrating labels, such as “pop science,” “pop psychology,” “cardboard Darwinism,” or “fundamentalist Darwinians” (similarly, Pinker [1997, 55] decries Gould’s hyperbolic rhetoric, including his description of the ideas of evolutionary psychology as “‘fatuous,’ ‘pathetic,’ and ‘egregiously simplistic’ and his use of some twenty-five synonyms for ‘fanatical’ “); oversimplifying his opponents’ positions in order to set up straw-man arguments, the classic being labeling his opponents as “genetic determinists”; protecting his own position by making illusory concessions to give the appearance of fair-mindedness in the attempt to restrict debate; claiming the moral high ground; ignoring relevant data known to all in the scientific community; proposing nonadaptationist alternatives without attempting to test them and ignoring data supporting adaptationist interpretations; arguing that proximate explanations (i.e., explanations of how a trait works at the neurophysiological level) render ultimate explanations (i.e., the adaptive function of the trait) unnecessary.

The comments of Maynard Smith, Wright, and Alcock highlight the important issue that despite the scholarly community’s widespread recognition of Gould’s intellectual dishonesty, Gould has been highly publicized as a public spokesperson on issues related to evolution and intelligence. As Alcock (1997) notes, Gould, as a widely published Harvard professor, makes it respectable to be an anti-adaptationist, and I have noticed this effect not only among the educated public but also among many academics outside the biological sciences. He has had access to highly prestigious intellectual forums, including a regular column in *Natural History* and, along with Richard C. Lewontin (another scholar-activist whose works are discussed here), he is often featured as a book reviewer in the *New York Review of Books* (NYRB). The NYRB has long been a bastion of the intellectual left. In Chapter 4, I discuss the role of the NYRB in promulgating psychoanalysis, and in Chapter 6 the NYRB is listed among the journals of the New York Intellectuals, a predominantly Jewish coterie that dominated intellectual discourse in the post-World War II era. The point here is that Gould’s career of intellectual dishonesty has not existed in a vacuum but has been part and parcel of a wide-ranging movement that has dominated the most prestigious intellectual arenas in the United States and the West—a movement that is here conceptualized as a facet of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy.

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On a more personal level, I clearly recall that one of my first noteworthy experiences in graduate school in the behavioral sciences was being exposed to the great “instinct” debate between the German ethologists Konrad Lorenz and Iranäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt versus several predominantly Jewish American developmental psychobiologists (D. S. Lehrman, J. S. Rosenblatt, T. C. Schnierla, H. Moltz, G. Gottlieb, and E. Tobach). Lorenz’s connections to National Socialism (see Lerner 1992, 59ff) were a barely concealed aspect of this debate, and I remember feeling that I was witnessing some sort of ethnic warfare rather than a dispassionate scientific debate of the evidence. Indeed, the intense, extra-scientific passions these issues raised in some participants were openly admitted toward the end of this extraordinary conflict. In his 1970 contribution, Lehrman stated:

I should not point out irrational, emotion-laden elements in Lorenz’s reaction to criticism without acknowledging that, when I look over my 1953 critique of his theory, I perceive elements of hostility to which my target would have been bound to react. My critique does not now read to me like an analysis of a scientific problem, with an evaluation of the contribution of a particular point of view, but rather like an assault upon a theoretical point of view, the writer of which assault was not interested in pointing out what positive contributions that point of view had made.

More recently, as the debate has shifted away from opposing human ethology toward attacks on human sociobiology, several of these developmental psychobiologists have also become prominent critics of sociobiology (see Myers 1990, 225).

This is not, of course, to deny the very important contributions of these developmental psychobiologists and their emphasis on the role of the environment in behavioral development—a tradition that remains influential within developmental psychology in the writings of several theorists, including Alan Fogel, Richard Lerner, Arnold Sameroff, and Esther Thelen. Moreover, it must be recognized that several Jews have been important contributors to evolutionary thinking as it applies to humans as well as human behavioral genetics, including Daniel G. Freedman, Richard Herrnstein, Seymour Itzkoff, Irwin Silverman, Nancy Segal, Lionel Tiger, and Glenn Weisfeld. Of course, non-Jews have been counted among the critics of evolutionary-biological thinking. Nevertheless, the entire episode clearly indicates that there are often important human interests that involve Jewish identity and that influence scientific debate. The suggestion here is that one consequence of Judaism as a



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group evolutionary strategy has been to skew these debates in a manner that has impeded progress in the biological and social sciences.

Richard Lerner (1992) in his *Final Solutions: Biology, Prejudice, and Genocide* is perhaps the most egregious example of a scientist motivated to discredit evolutionary-biological thinking because of putative links with anti-Semitism. (Barry Mehler, a protégé of Jerry Hirsch, is also explicit in making these linkages, but he is far less prominent academically and functions mainly as a publicist for these views in leftist intellectual media. See Mehler [1984a,b]. Mehler graduated from Yeshiva University and organized a program, “The Jewish Experience in America 1880 to 1975,” at Washington University in St. Louis, suggesting a strong Jewish identification.) Lerner is a prominent developmental psychologist, and his volume indicates an intense personal involvement directed at combating anti-Semitism by influencing theory in the behavioral sciences. Prior to discussing the explicit links between Lerner’s theoretical perspective and his attempt to combat anti-Semitism, I will describe his theory and illustrate the type of strained thinking with which he has attempted to discredit the application of evolutionary thinking to human behavior.

Central to this program is Lerner’s rejection of biological determinism in favor of a dynamic, contextualist approach to human development. Lerner also rejects environmental determinism, but there is little discussion of the latter view because environmental determinism is “perhaps less often socially pernicious” (p. xx). In this regard, Lerner is surely wrong. A theory that there is no human nature would imply that humans could easily be programmed to accept all manner of exploitation, including slavery. From a radical environmentalist perspective, it should not matter how societies are constructed, since people should be able to learn to accept any type of social structure. Women could easily be programmed to accept rape, and ethnic groups could be programmed to accept their own domination by other ethnic groups. The view that radical environmentalism is not socially pernicious also ignores the fact that the communist government of the Soviet Union murdered millions of its citizens and later engaged in officially sponsored anti-Semitism while committed to an ideology of radical environmentalism.<sup>67</sup>

Lerner’s dynamic contextualism pays lip service to biological influences while actually rendering them inconsequential and unanalyzable. This theory has strong roots in the developmental psychobiological tradition described above, and there are numerous references to these writers. The dynamic contextualist perspective conceptualizes development as a dialectical interaction between organism and environment. Biological influences are viewed as a reality, but they are ultimately unanalyzable, since they are viewed as being inextricably fused with environmental influences. The most notable conclusion is that any attempt to study genetic variation as an independently analyzable influence on individual

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differences (the program of the science of quantitative behavior genetics) is rejected. Many of the critics of sociobiology have also been strong opponents of behavior genetic research (e.g., S. J. Gould, J. Hirsch, L. Kamin, R. C. Lewontin, and S. Rose). For a particularly egregious example embodying practically every possible misunderstanding of basic behavior genetic concepts, see Gould (1998).

It bears mentioning that dynamic contextualism and its emphasis on the dialectical interaction between organism and environment bear more than a passing resemblance to Marxism. The foreword of Lerner's book was written by R. C. Lewontin, the Harvard population biologist who has engaged in a high-profile attempt to fuse science, leftist politics, and opposition to evolutionary and biological theorizing about human behavior (e.g., Levins & Lewontin 1985; see Wilson 1994). Lewontin (with Steven Rose and Leon Kamin) was the first author of *Not in Our Genes* (1984)—a book that begins with a statement of the authors' commitment to socialism (p. ix) and, among a great many other intellectual sins, continues the disinformation regarding the role of IQ testing in the immigration debates of the 1920s and its putative links to the Holocaust (p. 27). Indeed, E. O. Wilson (1994, 344), whose synthetic volume *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis* (Wilson 1975) inaugurated the field of sociobiology, notes that "without Lewontin, the [sociobiology] controversy would not have been so intense or attracted such widespread attention."

In his foreword to Lerner's book, Lewontin states that developmental contextualism is "the alternative to biological and cultural determinism. It is the statement of the developmental contextual view that is the important central point of *Final Solutions*, and it is the full elaboration of that point of view that is a pressing program for social theory. Nowhere has this world view been put more succinctly than in Marx's third Thesis on Feurbach" (p. ix). Lewontin goes on to quote a passage from Marx that does indeed express something like the fundamental idea of developmental contextualism. Gould (1987, 153) has also endorsed a Marxist dialectical perspective in the social sciences.

Lerner devotes much of his book to showing that dynamic contextualism, because of its emphasis on plasticity, provides a politically acceptable perspective on racial and sexual differences, as well as promising a hope for ending anti-Semitism. This type of messianic, redemptionist attempt to develop a universalist theoretical framework within which Jewish-gentile group differences are submerged in importance is a common feature of other predominantly Jewish movements in the twentieth century, including radical political theories and psychoanalysis (see Chs. 3, 4). The common theme is that these ideologies have been consistently promoted by individuals who, like Lerner, are self-consciously pursuing a Jewish ethnic and political agenda. (Recall also Gould's tendency to seize the moral high ground.) However, the ideologies are advocated because of their universalist promise to lead humanity to a higher level of morality—a level



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of morality in which there is continuity of Jewish group identity but an eradication of anti-Semitism. As such, dynamic contextualism can be seen as one of many post-Enlightenment attempts to reconcile Judaism with the modern world.

There is no question that Lerner strongly believes in the moral imperative of his position, but his moral crusade has led him well beyond science in his attempts to discredit biological theories in the interests of combating anti-Semitism.<sup>68</sup> Lerner coauthored an article in the journal *Human Development* (Lerner & von Eye 1992) directed at combating the influence of biological thinking in research on human development. My edited volume (*Sociobiological Perspectives on Human Development*, MacDonald 1988b) is prominently cited as an example of an evolutionary approach deriving from E. O. Wilson's work and as a point of view that has "found support and application" (p. 13). As their example of how this point of view has been supported and applied, Lerner and von Eye cite the work of J. Philippe Rushton on racial differences in r/K reproductive styles. The implication would appear to be that my edited volume was somehow a basis of Rushton's work. This is inaccurate, since (1) the volume never mentioned Negroid-Caucasian differences in intelligence or any other phenotype, and (2) the book was published after Rushton had already published his work on the r/K theory of racial differences. However, the association between this book and Rushton is highly effective in producing a negative evaluation of the book because of Rushton's current *persona non grata* status as a theorist of racial differences (see Gross 1990).

The next section of the Lerner and von Eye article is entitled "Genetic Determinism as Sociobiology's Key to Interdisciplinary Integration." Implicit in this juxtaposition is the implication that the authors in my edited volume accept the thesis of genetic determinism, and indeed, at the end of the section Lerner and von Eye lump my edited volume together with the work of a number of other sociobiological writers who are said to believe that anatomy is destiny, that environmental influences are fictional, and that "the social world does not interact with humans' genes" (p. 18).

Scholars connected to evolutionary perspectives on human behavior or behavior genetics have commonly been branded genetic determinists in this highly politicized literature. Such accusations are a staple of Gouldian rhetoric and are a major theme of Lewontin et al.'s (1984) overtly political *Not in Our Genes*. I rather doubt that any of the writers discussed in this section of Lerner and von Eye's paper can accurately be described as genetic determinists (see the reply to Lerner & von Eye's article by Burgess & Molenaar [1993]). Indeed, Degler (1991, 310) accurately summarizes recent evolutionary thinking in the social sciences as characterized by "a full recognition of the power and influence of environment on culture." However, I would like to stress here that this is a

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completely inaccurate characterization of my writings and it is difficult to suppose that Lerner was unaware of this. Two of my contributions to the edited volume are greatly concerned with environmental and cultural influences on behavior and the underdetermination of behavior by the genes. In particular, my theoretical perspective, as described in Chapter 1 of the edited volume (MacDonald 1988b), takes a strong position supporting the importance of developmental plasticity and affirming the importance of contextual influences on human development. And in both of these sections of my paper I cite Richard Lerner's work. However, Lerner and von Eye are seemingly careful to avoid actually describing what I have written. Instead, their strategy is that of innuendo and guilt by association: By placing my edited book at the end of a section devoted to writers who are supposedly genetic determinists, they manage to imply that all of the writers in the volume are genetic determinists. Unfortunately, such innuendo is typical in attacks on evolutionary perspectives on human behavior.

The point here is that there is every reason to suppose that a major impetus for these attacks is an attempt to combat anti-Semitism. Lerner begins his preface to *Final Solutions: Biology, Prejudice, and Genocide* with an emotionally wrenching portrait of his childhood surrounded by stories of Nazi atrocities. "As a Jewish boy growing up in Brooklyn in the late 1940's and early 1950's I could not escape Hitler. He, Nazis, the Gestapo, Auschwitz were everywhere" (p. xv). Lerner re-creates a conversation with his grandmother describing the fate of some of his relatives at the hands of the Nazis. He asks why the Nazis hated the Jews, and his grandmother responds by saying, "Just because." Lerner states, "In the time that has passed since that afternoon in my grandmother's apartment I have learned—and increasingly so as the years go by—how deeply I was affected by these early lessons about Nazi genocide. I now understand that much of my life has been shaped by my attempts to go beyond the answer of 'Just because'" (p. xvii).

Lerner states that he chose to study developmental psychology because the nature-nurture issue is central to this field and therefore central to his attempt to combat anti-Semitism. Lerner thus apparently actually chose his career in an effort to advance Jewish interests in the social sciences. In the preface, Lerner cites as intellectual influences virtually the entire list of predominantly Jewish developmental psychobiologists and anti-sociobiologists mentioned above, including Gottlieb, Gould, Kamin, Lewontin, Rose, Schneirla (who was not Jewish), and Tobach. As is common among Jewish historians (see *SAID*, Ch. 7), Lerner dedicates the book to his family, "To all my relatives... Your lives will not be forgotten" (p. xxii). Clearly there is no pretense that this book is a dispassionate scientific endeavor to develop a theory of behavioral development or to come to grips with ethnically based social conflict.

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The central message of Lerner's book is that there is a possible causal chain linking Darwinism to an ideology of genetic determinism, to the legitimization of the status quo as a biological imperative, to negatively evaluating individuals with "inferior" genotypes, to eugenics, and finally to destruction of those with inferior genes. This story line is said to have been played out in several historical instances, including the massacres of Native Americans and the Ottoman genocide of Armenians, and most particularly in the Holocaust. It is nowhere mentioned that an ideology of genetic determinism is hardly a necessary condition for genocide, since there are a great many historical examples of genocide in societies where Darwin was unknown, including the annihilation of the Amorites and Midianites by the Israelites described in the Tanakh (see *PTSDA*, Ch. 3)—examples that are ignored by Lerner. Nor is there evidence that, for example, the Ottoman Turks were acquainted with Darwin or had views, scientific or otherwise, about the genetic determination of behavior.

Lerner's agenda is to discredit evolutionary thinking because of its association with Nazism. The logic is as follows (Lerner 1992, 17-19): Although Lerner acknowledges that genetic determinists need not be "racists" and that they may even have "enlightened" political views, he states that genetic determinism is an ideology that can be used to give scientific credence to their viewpoint: "The doctrine of biological determinism exists ready for co-optation by proponents of such a political movement" (p. 17). Sociobiology, as the most recent incarnation of the scientific justification of genetic determinism, must be intellectually discredited: "Contemporary sociobiologists are certainly not neo-Nazis. They do not in any way advocate genocide and may not even espouse conservative political views. Nevertheless, the correspondence between their ideas (especially regarding women) and those of the Nazi theorists is more than striking" (p. 20).

Lerner correctly describes Nazi ideology as essentially an ideology of group impermeability, "the belief that the world... may be divided unequivocally into two major groups: an ingroup comprising those possessing the best features of human existence, and an outgroup comprising the worst features of human existence. There can be no crossing-over between these groups, because blood, or genes, divides them" (p. 17). Similarly, Lewontin, in his foreword to Lerner's book, states that "whatever the generating forces that keep nationalism alive... they must, in the end, assert the unchanging and unchangeable nature of social identity... Exploiters and exploited alike share in the consciousness of a cultural and biological heritage that marks out indelible group boundaries that transcend human historical development" (p. viii).

Lerner and Lewontin condemn sociobiology because they suppose that sociobiology could be used to justify such a result. However, the evolutionary theory of social identity processes developed in *SAID* (Ch. 1) as the basis of the

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theory of anti-Semitism implies just the opposite: Although humans appear to be biologically predisposed toward ingroup-outgroup conflict, there is no reason whatever to suppose that group membership or group permeability itself is genetically determined; that is, there is no reason to suppose that there is a genetic imperative that societies *must* be organized around impermeable groups, and indeed, prototypical Western societies have not been organized in this manner. Social identity research indicates that hostility toward outgroups occurs even in randomly composed groups and even in the absence of between-group competition. The outstanding feature of Judaism has been that it has steadfastly raised barriers between Jews as an ingroup and the surrounding society as an outgroup. But, though it is reasonable to suppose that Jews are genetically more prone to ethnocentrism than Western peoples (see *PTSDA*, Ch. 8; *SAID*, Ch. 1), the erection of cultural barriers between Jews and gentiles is a critical aspect of Judaism as a culture.

Moreover, a salient point here is that there is no appreciation in either Lerner or Lewontin of the great extent to which Jews have themselves created impermeable groups in which genetic blood lines were of the highest importance, in which there were hierarchies of racial purity, and in which genetic and cultural assimilation were viewed as anathema (see *PTSDA*, passim). Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy has resulted in societies torn apart by internal conflict between impermeable, competing ethnic groups (see *SAID*, Chs. 2-5). Nevertheless, Jewish cultural practices are at least a necessary condition for the group impermeability that has been so central to Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy. It is thus a supreme irony that Lewontin and Lerner should be attempting to combat anti-Semitism by saying that ethnic identification and the permeability of groups are not genetically determined.

There are good reasons to suppose that group permeability is not genetically determined, and the evidence reviewed in *PTSDA* indicates that Jews have been exquisitely aware of this since the origins of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy. At times Jewish groups have endeavored to foster an illusion of group permeability in order to minimize anti-Semitism (see *SAID*, Ch. 6). Although Jews may well be genetically predisposed to form impermeable ethnic groups and resist genetic and cultural assimilation, there is little reason to suppose that this is genetically determined. Indeed, the evidence reviewed in *PTSDA* (Chs. 7, 8) indicates the central importance of several cultural and environmental factors for the success of Judaism as a relatively impermeable group evolutionary strategy: intensive socialization for a Jewish ingroup identity and group allegiance, the great variety of mechanisms of separation (clothes, language, hair styles, etc.), and the cultural invention of the hereditary priestly and levitical classes. Moreover, the removal of intensive cultural separatism characteristic of Judaism in traditional societies has resulted in a long term decline of Diaspora

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Judaism. As a result, in the contemporary Western world Jewish groups often go to great lengths to discourage intermarriage and to develop greater Jewish consciousness and commitment among Jews. This attempt to reestablish the cultural supports for Jewish identification and non-assimilation often involves the suggestion of a return to Jewish religious belief and ritual as the only way to stave off the long-term assimilative pressures of contemporary Western societies (see *SAID*, Ch. 9).

## CONCLUSION

A common thread of this chapter has been that scientific skepticism and what one might term “scientific obscurantism” have been useful tools in combating scientific theories one dislikes for deeper reasons. Thus, the Boasian demand for the highest standards of proof for generalizations about culture and for establishing a role for genetic variation in the development of individual differences coincided with the acceptance of an “anti-theory” of culture that was fundamentally in opposition to attempts to develop classifications and generalizations in the field.<sup>69</sup> Similarly, the dynamic-contextualist theoretical perspective, though rejecting behavioral genetics and evolutionary theorizing about human development as failing to meet scientific standards of proof, has proposed a theory of development in which the relation between genes and environment is an extremely complex and ultimately unanalyzable fusion. Moreover, a major theme of Chapter 5 is that the radical skepticism of the Frankfurt School of Social Research was self-consciously directed at deconstructing universalist, assimilatory theories of society as a homogeneous, harmonious whole.

Scientific skepticism regarding politically sensitive issues has also been a powerful trend in the writings of S. J. Gould (see, e.g., Gould 1987, *passim*; Gould 1991, 13). Carl Degler (1991, 322) says of Gould that “an opponent of sociobiology like Gould does indeed emphasize that interaction [between biology and environment], but at the same time, he persistently resists investigations of the role of each of the interacting elements.” Jensen (1982, 124) states of Gould’s work on intelligence testing, “I believe that he has succeeded brilliantly in obfuscating all the important open questions that actually concern today’s scientists.” This type of intellectual work is aimed at precluding the development of general theories of human behavior in which genetic variation plays an independently analyzable causative role in producing adaptive behavior.

We have seen how R. C. Lewontin has linked theories of behavioral development with Marxist political ideology. As do Lerner and Gould, Lewontin

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advocates theories proposing that nature consists of extremely complex dialectical interactions between organism and environment. Lewontin rejects reductionistic scientific methods, such as quantitative behavioral genetics or the use of analysis of variance procedures, because they inevitably oversimplify real processes in their use of averages (Segerstråle 1986). The result is a hyper-purism that settles for nothing less than absolute certainty and absolutely correct methodology, epistemology, and ontology. In developmental psychology such a program would ultimately lead to rejection of all generalizations, including those relating to the average effects of environments. Because each individual has a unique set of genes and is constantly developing in a unique and constantly changing environment, God himself would probably have difficulty providing a deterministic account of individual development, and in any case such an account must necessarily, like a Boasian theory of culture, be deferred long into the future.

By adopting this philosophy of science, Lewontin is able to discredit attempts by scientists to develop theories and generalizations and thus, in the name of scientific rigor, avoid the possibility of any politically unacceptable scientific findings. Segerstråle notes that, while using this theory as a weapon against biological views in the social sciences, Lewontin's own empirical research in population biology has remained firmly within the reductionistic tradition.

Gould and Lewontin's (1979) critique of adaptationism may also be viewed as an exemplar of the skeptical thrust of Jewish intellectual activity. Acknowledging the existence of adaptations, the argument effectively problematizes the status of any putative adaptation. Gould (e.g., 1994a) then goes from the possibility that any putative adaptation may simply be a "spandrel" that, like the architectural form from which its name derives, results from structural constraints imposed by true adaptations, to the remarkable suggestion that the human mind be viewed as a collection of such nonfunctional spandrels. As noted above, Gould's larger agenda is to convince his audience that the human brain has not evolved to solve adaptive problems—a view anthropologist Vincent Sarich (1995) has termed "behavioral creationism." (For mainstream views on adaptationism, see Boyd & Richerson 1985, 282; Dennett 1995; Hull 1988, 424-426; Williams 1985.) Indeed, fascination with the slippery rhetoric of the Gould and Lewontin "spandrels" article has resulted in an entire volume of essays dedicated to dissecting the writing style of this essay (Selzer 1993; see especially Fahnestock 1993; see also Joseph Carroll's [1995, 449ff] comments on the deceptiveness of Lewontin's rhetorical style).

Scientific skepticism is a powerful approach, since a very basic feature of science is an openness to criticism and a requirement that arguments be supported with evidence. As E. O. Wilson (1994, 345) notes, "By adopting a



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narrow criterion of publishable research, Lewontin freed himself to pursue a political agenda unencumbered by science. He adopted the relativist view that accepted truth, unless based on ineluctable fact, is no more than a reflection of dominant ideology and political power.”<sup>70</sup> Similar themes with similar motivations characterize the ideologies of the Frankfurt School and postmodernism discussed in Chapter 5.

Nevertheless, Lewontin (1994a, 34) portrays his ideologically inspired efforts as deriving from a concern for scientific rigor: “We demand certain canons of evidence and argument that are formal and without reference to empirical content... the logic of statistical inference; the power of replicating experiments; the distinction between observations and causal claims.” The result is a thoroughgoing skepticism; for example, all theories of the origins of the sexual division of labor are said to be “speculative” (Lewontin 1994a, 34). Similarly, Gould rejects all accounts of the empirical data in the area of intelligence testing but provides no alternatives. As Jensen (1982, 131) notes, “Gould offers no alternative ideas to account for all of these well-established observations. His mission in this area appears entirely nihilistic.” Similarly, Buss et al. (1998) note that whereas the adaptationist perspective in psychology has resulted in a rich body of theoretical predictions and in numerous confirmatory empirical studies, Gould’s ideas of spandrels and exaptations (a term variously used by Gould, but perhaps most often referring to mechanisms that have new biological functions that are not the ones that caused the original selection of the mechanism) has resulted in no theoretical predictions and no empirical research. Again, the mission seems to be what one might term nihilistic anti-science.

As with Boas, Lewontin holds biologically oriented research on humans to an extremely rigorous standard but is remarkably lenient in the standards required to prove biology has very little influence. Lewontin claims, for example, that “nearly all the biology of gender is bad science” (Lewontin 1994a, 34), but on the following page he states as an obvious truth that “the human being is the nexus of a large number of weakly acting causes.” And Lewontin states without argument or reference that “no one has ever found a correlation between cognitive ability and brain size” (p. 34). At this writing there have been at least 26 published studies on 39 independent samples showing a correlation of approximately 0.20 between head circumference and IQ (see Wickett et al. 1994); there have also been at least 6 published studies showing a correlation of approximately 0.40 between brain size and IQ using the more accurate technique of magnetic resonance imaging to directly scan the brain (Andreasen et al. 1993; Egan et al. 1994; Harvey et al. 1994; Raz et al. 1993; Wickett et al. 1994; Willerman et al. 1991). Given this body of findings, it is at least misleading to make such a statement, although Lewontin (see Lewontin 1994b) would